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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Court of Appeals' majority decision that Gillmor's Complaint is barred
by res judicata is incorrect because of the "private" nature of the prior actions
between the parties and the "public interest" nature of the claims in the instant
case. This case should therefore be remanded to the District Court to allow the
matter to proceed on the merits. Second, a finding of res judicata does not
automatically lead to sanctions. Thus, and because Gillmor's argument on res
judicata could not possibly have violated Rule 11(b)(2), UTAH R. CIV. P., as it was
found meritorious by a Judge of the Court of Appeals, the sanctions awarded by
the District Court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals based on an incorrect
standard of review should be vacated.
ARGUMENT
I.

Res judicata does not apply.
Appellees claim in their Brief that Gillmor does not refute the Court of

Appeals' decision that res judicata applied. That is, obviously, incorrect. In her
initial Brief on this Writ Gillmor refuted the Court of Appeals' majority decision by
relying on the dissenting opinion in that case. Just because Gillmor's counsel
relied on a dissenting judge of the Court of Appeals instead of adding more words
to the initial Brief does not alter the fact that Gillmor believes that Judge
Thome's reading of the law was right while the majority opinion was incorrect.
Judge Thome's differentiation between the "private" nature of the prior
actions between the parties and the "public interest" nature of the claims in the
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instant case was well reasoned, clearly written and, Gillmor believes, persuasive.
Gillmor v. Family Link, 2010 UT App 2, at HU24-27 and fn. 7. There is no
pressing need to add more verbiage to Judge Thome's clean argument. But, since
Appellees' requested more words on the subject, the first suit, between Mrs.
Gillmor's husband and Mr. Richards, resulted in a private easement agreement as
a settlement. The second suit was brought by Mrs. Gillmor to enforce that private
easement agreement.
This suit is not based at all on the private easement. Instead, the
Complaint in this matter contains two claims: one for condemnation and one for
a declaration of "highway-by-use" pursuant to State statute. Both of these claims
are based on different facts and law than were alleged in the previous two
Complaints. Therefore, QED according to Judge Thorne, Gillmor's Complaint is
not barred by res judicata.
The dissent and the majority opinion at the Court of Appeals both utilize
Mack v. Utah State Dep't of Commerce, 224 P.3d 741, 746 and 749 (Utah 2009),
in reaching their respective and differing conclusions. The majority well outlined
the transactional approach and the history of the same:
[T]he claim that is alleged to be barred must have been
presented in the first suit or be one that could and
should have been raised in the first action.' . . . * * * 'A
claim or cause of action is the aggregate of operative
facts which give rise to a right enforceable in the courts.'
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'Claims or causes of action are the same as those
brought or that could have been brought in the first
action if they arise from the same operative facts, or in
other words from the same transaction.'... 'What factual
grouping constitutes a 'transaction/ ... [is] to be
determined

pragmatically, giving weight to

such

considerations as whether the facts are related in time,
space, origin, or motivations [and] whether they form a
convenient trial unit. ...' Accordingly, 'res judicata ...
turn[s] the essential similarity of the underlying events
giving rise to the various legal claims/ or a common
motivation behind those claims, '[r]ather than resting
on the specific legal theory invoked.' 'Defining the scope
of a claim or cause of action is not an exact science and,
in fact, is at times driven by the relative importance of
the finality of the judgment. When as in this case,... real
property is at issue, the need for finality is at its apex.'
Gillmor at Iffi 11-12 (internal citations omitted).
The dissent utilized the pragmatic approach discussed in Mack to
determine that the transactional approach did not bar Gillmor's complaint: "The
objective of claim preclusion is 'that a controversy should be adjudicated only
once.' This, however, is not feasible in the present case where members of the
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public may still pursue a public claim regardless of prior private right litigation/'
Gillmor at H 25 (internal citation omitted). Because "the precise facts and issues"
were not determined in the prior suits res judicata should not bar this complaint.
Citizens Opposing Pollution v. Exxonmobil Coal U.SA., 2010 WL 3767800, 9 (111.
App. 5 Dist).
Appellees cite Irving Pulp & Paper Ltd. V. Kelly, 654 A.2d 416 (Me. 1995),
in support of their claim that res judicata applies here. (Appellees' Brief, p. 7.)
Although the Irving Court found that a previous action would bar a claim of
adverse possession, starting prior to the date of the previous action, the Court did
not find that the previous action acted as a complete bar to all new actions
regarding access between the parties. Id. at 418, ("As a matter of law, however,
the 1951 judgment precludes the Kellys from having or claiming any right or title
adverse to Irving for any period prior to November IQ51." (Emphasis added.))
Similarly, Gillmor's claims here, which are based on different facts and different
laws should not be barred based on any previous actions.
Appellees' also cite Bagley v. Moxley, 407 Mass. 633, 555 N.E.2d 229
(Mass. 1990) to support their argument that this suit is barred by res judicata.
(Appellees' Brief, p. 7.) However, again, the Bagley case is distinguishable for at
least two reasons. First, in Bagley the plaintiffs brought three actions within six
months of one another, where here the actions are separated by approximately 25
years. Id. at 633-634. (Bagley I was filed on April 27,1987, Bagley II was filed
on August 13,1987 and Bagley IIIwas filed on October 2,1987.) Second,
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although the claims in Bagley II and Bagley III were somewhat different, the
complaints contained some of the same facts. Id. at 637-638. On the contrary,
the complaints in each of the Gillmor actions contain both different facts and
different claims, and that is why the "transactional approach" adopted by this
Court in Mack should not bar Gillmor's complaint.
II.

Res judicata does not apply because there was a change in the law.
Additionally, res judicata does not bar this Complaint because of the

change in law regarding a "highway by use" claim from the time the Court of
Appeals interpreted the easement agreement in 2005 to now. Accordingly, this
Court should remand the matter to the District Court to decide the claims
between these parties, on the merits.
The Court of Appeals decision against Gillmor in 2005 resulted in an
altered situation for Gillmor because it minimized access to her land. In fact the
decision minimized her access to the point that she will be unable to
meaningfully leave her land to her children because they, specifically, been found
to have no vehicular access to the land.1

1 "However, given our conclusion, the grant of access is narrow as to those it
benefits. Thus, Nadine's own children, as Frank's step-children, do not receive
the benefit of this specifically authorized use of the easements as they are not
related to Frank by any degree of consanguinity. As a result, we also conclude
that the trial court erred in determining that this grant extended to Nadine's
"spouse, if any in the future, along with her children, their spouses and children."
Any future spouse of Nadine is plainly not anticipated or included in the language
of the provision and, likewise, Nadine's children do not qualify as Frank Gillmor's
immediate family to the first degree of consanguinity, nor are they Frank's
children. Moreover, while the purposes for which Nadine personally and
5

Appellees claim that "highway-by-use" law has merely been clarified and
not changed so res judicata is applicable. (Appellees' Brief, pp. 13-15.)
Additionally, Appellees make the argument that this issue was not preserved with
the District Court. (Appellees' Brief, p. 13) Of course this argument was
preserved with the District Court. (See for example, R. 229, pp. 23, 26, 29 and
61.) However, preservation of this issue is irrelevant since the District Court
decided this matter on a motion to dismiss and determined res judicata applied
before reaching the merits of Gillmor's claims. See R. 109.
Specifically, Collins v. Sandy City Board ofAdjustment, 16 P.3d 1251 (Utah
Ct. App. 2000) supports Gillmor's position that "highway-by-use" law has
changed and therefore the Complaint in this case is not subject to a res judicata
bar. For the change in the law, see Utah County u. Butler, 2008 UT 122; Town of
Leeds v. Prisbey, 2008 UT 113; Wasatch County v. Okelberry, 2008 UT icH. In

individually intends to access the Gillmor property using the easements are not
limited to those purposes set forth in the Agreement-i.e., animal husbandry,
property maintenance, hunting, etc.-her personal right of access does not expand
the rights of any other person to use the easements or the purposes for which the
easements may be used, beyond what is stated in the Agreement." Gillmor v.
Macey, 121 P.3d 57, 67, H23 (Utah Ct.App. 2005).
2 "In this and two companion cases that we also decide today, we consider the
operation and application of Utah Code section 72-5-104(1) (the "Dedication
Statute." Butler at Hi.
3 "In Wasatch County v. Okelberry, a companion case that we decide today, we
set forth a bright-line rule for determining what qualifies as an interruption in
continuous use sufficient to restart the running of the Dedication Statute's tenyear period ..." Town of Leeds at If 6.
4 "We hold today that an overt act that is intended by the property owner to
interrupt the use as a public thoroughfare, and is reasonably calculated to do so,
6

Collins the Court held that the law had changed based on an interpretation of an
ordinance. Id. at 1254. Gillmor argues the same here where the Supreme Court
of Utah interpreted and applied the Dedication Statute in Wasatch County v.
Okelberry, and Town of Leeds v. Prisby, and Utah County v. Butler. Such a selfasserted comprehensive interpretation and explication from the Supreme Court
constitutes a change in the law that makes res judicata inapplicable.
The Collins Court cites both State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co. v. Duel, 324
U.S. 154 (1945) and Statler v. Catalano, 293 Ill.App.3d 483, 229 Ill.Dec. 274,691
N.E.2d 384 (1997) in support of its decision. Further discussion from the Statler
Court is instructive on why res judicata is inapplicable to Gillmor's claims:
The doctrine of res judicata is of judicial origin and has
been characterized as a rule of convenience designed to
prevent repetitious law suits over matters which have
once

been

decided

and

which

have

remained

substantially static, factually and legally, but which must
give way where there has been a change in the
fundamental controlling legal principles. Similarly, the
rule prevails in Illinois that res judicata extends only to
the facts and conditions as they were at the time a
judgment was rendered, and to the legal rights and

is an interruption in continuous use sufficient to restart the running of the tenyear period under this statute." Wasatch County at If 20.
7

relations of the parties as fixed by the facts so
determined; and when new facts or conditions intervene
before the second action, establishing a new basis for
the claims and defenses of the parties respectfully, the
issues are no longer the same, and hence the former
judgment cannot be pleaded as a bar in the subsequent
action. Even though the basic facts have not changed, it
is generally accepted that res judicata does not operate
as an automatic bar where between the time of the first
judgment and the second there has been an intervening
decision or a change in the law creating an altered
situation.
Statler at 276-277 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
In this case both the facts and the law relating to these claims have
changed - the situation has not remained static - so res judicata does not bar the
two claims in her Complaint that is at issue here and this Court should thus
remand the matter to the District Court to decide those claims on the merits.
III.

Sanctions should not have been awarded because Rule 11(b)(2), UTAH R.

CIV. P., was not violated.
Rule 11 requires that an attorney make a reasonable inquiry into the validity
of the action prior to filing a complaint:
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[B]y presenting a pleading ... an attorney ... is certifying
that to the best of the person's knowledge, information,
and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the
circumstances, * * * (b)(2) the claims, defenses, and
other legal contentions therein are warranted by
existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or
the establishment of new law.
Rule 11(b)(2), UTAH R. CIV. P. (emphasis added).
Simply, Rule 11(b)(2) was not violated. Gillmor's claims have not been brought in
any other suit, are nonfrivolous and either will establish new law (private
condemnation) or are warranted by exiting law ("highway-by-use").
Gillmor's counsel, after conducting research, determined there were
reasonable basis to bring the claims. "Rule 11 does not impose a duty to do
perfect or exhaustive research. The appropriate standard is whether the research
was objectively reasonable under all of the circumstances." Barnard v. Sutliff,
846 P.2d 1229,1236 (Utah 1992) (emphasis added). There is no finding, by either
the District Court, or the Court of Appeals, that Gillmor's counsel did not do
"objectively reasonable" research before bringing the Complaint, and this would
seem to be the objective inquiry that Utah law requires. In fact, the District Court
appears to have found that Gillmor's counsel did do research: "Neither can I find
sufficient evidence in the record to show the absence of an honest belief that the
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action might be justified, or that the action was filed to take unconscionable
advantage of defendants." R. at 200.
Instead of looking at the issue of "objectively reasonable" research, the
District Court believed that because it found that res judicata applied that Rule 11
sanctions must follow ipso facto. The Court of Appeals agreed and cited this
standard for review of sanctions: "In view of our conclusion that Mrs. Gillmor's
claims are barred by res judicata, the appropriate standard of review is whether the
district court's decision to impose sanctions was an abuse of discretion. See
Archuleta, 2008 UT 76,1f 7."
However, the Court of Appeals applied the wrong standard. The correct
standard is: "[T]he standard of review for evaluating ... rule 11 sanctions involves
a three-tiered approach: '1) findings of fact are reviewed under a clearly
erroneous standard; 2) legal conclusions are reviewed under the correction of
error standard; and 3) the type and amount of sanction to be imposed is reviewed
under an abuse of discretion standard.'" Morse v. Packer i5P.3d 1021,1025
(Utah 2000) (citing Barnard u. Sutliff, 846 P.2d 1229,1234 (Utah 1992).
Because the District Court appears to have found that Gillmor's counsel did
research, and the Court of Appeals did not review any of the District Court's
findings, the Court of Appeals did not do even step one of the three steps that must
be taken to review an award of Rule 11 sanctions. The Court of Appeals exacerbated
this error when it merely reiterated that the District Court was correct in
determining that because res judicata applied that the sanctions were correct, and
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skipped right to the third step, while omitting the previous two steps. Because the
Court of Appeals upheld the District Court's decision based on an abuse of
discretion standard, instead of reviewing the findings of fact and then interpreting
the law on sanctions before reaching the abuse of discretion issue, the majority
decision was based on the incorrect standard.
Even if this Court finds that res judicata is applicable and that Gillmor's
Complaint is subject to dismissal, Rule 11 sanctions do not ineluctably follow: "[W]e
cannot say that [counsel's] reading of the law, alone, supports the conclusion that he
did not make a reasonable inquiry into the claims, defenses, and other legal
contentions contained in the complaint." Hess v. Johnston, 163 P.3d 747,751 (Utah
Ct. App. 2007). Rule 11 sanctions should only be upheld when all three steps, are
found to have been met on review, and sanctions are not warranted here, unless
Gillmor's lawyer failed to make a reasonable inquiry into the claims asserted in the
Complaint. As the first lawsuit resulted in an easement agreement and the second
concerned contract interpretation (which is what a dispute over the settlement
agreement is) and did not concern public rights, as were asserted in this Complaint,
it is error to find that filing the Complaint is unreasonable.
In fact a judge from the Court of Appeals agreed with Gillmor's counsel on the
resjudictata component - presumably after he and his clerks conducted "objectively
reasonable" research. Therefore, how can the Rule 11 standard, which is based on
that same "objective reasonableness," be found to have been breached? See Kamen
v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 791 F.2d 1006,1012 (2nd Cir. 1986) ("'after
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reasonable inquiry, a competent attorney could *** form a reasonable belief that
the pleading is well grounded in fact and law, Eastway, 762 F.2d at 254" (emphasis
in original).)
Appellees claim that numerous courts throughout the country have held a
finding of "res judicata is sufficient to justify Rule 11 sanctions." (Appellees' Brief,
p. 19.) Of course, the cases cited by Appellees are distinguishable and are
distinguished, in the same order cited by Appellees', in their Brief: First, Schoney v.
MemI Estates, Inc., 863 P.2d 59,62 (Utah CtApp. 1993) concerned the exact
complaint that had been brought previously, while here there is a new complaint
and new claims. ("Based on the trial court's review of the prior proceedings, it
concluded the attempt to go forward with the class action, in light of the complete
resolution of the matter eleven months prior, was 'unconscionable and beyond
reason.'" (emphasis added.)) Second, in Cannon v. Loyola Univ. of Chicago, 784
F.2d 777,780 (7th Cir. 1986) concerned a complaint based on the same facts, which
is not the case with Gillmor's complaint. ("Although Mrs. Cannon's theory of relief
has changed slightly, her complaint is based on the same facts as her previous suits.
... Each suit sought the remedy the same single alleged wrong." (emphasis added).)
Third, in King v. Hoover Group, Inc., 958 F.2d 219, 223 (8 th Cir. 1991) the
complaint likewise contained similar facts and issues, unlike Gillmor's complaint.
("King's counsel should have realized that King II was barred by King I because of
the identity of facts and issues." (emphasis added).) Fourth, in Paganucci v. City of
New York, 785 F.Supp. 467,475 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), again, the complaint stated the
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same claim, while Gillmor's claims have never been brought previously. ("The
complaint in Marino states the same claim as the complaint in the instant case.
Indeed, large portions of the two complaints are virtually identical/' (emphasis
added).) Fifth, in Nothwang v. Payless Drug Stores NW, Inc., 139 F.R.D. 675, 676
(D. Or. 1991) the plaintiffs counsel admitted that the complaint was deficient, and
no such claim has been made by Gillmor's counsel, who still believes in the merits of
the claims in the Complaint. ("Moreover, counsel for Nothwang acknowledged the
deficiency of the complaint through a letter to the court. Having found that counsel
for Nothwang signed a frivolous complaint, Rule 11 sanctions must be imposed."
(emphasis added).) Sixth, in Estate of Blue v. County of Los Angeles, 120 F.3d 982,
983 (9th Cir. 1997) three complaints were brought using the same claims and the
same parties, which again, is not the case here. ("This is the third lawsuit involving
the same civil rights claims and these parties" (emphasis added).)
On the other hand, courts have also found that res judicata alone does not
warrant sanctions. See Belmont Partners, LLC v. Mina Mar Group, Inc., 2010 WL
3860381, 9-10 (W.D.Va 2010); Richter v. Russo, 647 F.Supp. 565,570 (S.D.N.Y.
1986); Young v. Suffolk County, 705 F.Supp.2d 183, 214-215 (E.D.N.Y. 2010):
'Rule 11 is violated only when it is patently clear that a
claim has absolutely no chance of success.' Quoting
Oliveri v. Thompson, 801 F.2d 1265,1275 (2nd Cir. 1986).
Additionally, 'when divining the point at which an
argument turns from merely losing to losing and
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sanctionable, ... courts [must] resolve all doubts in favor
of the signer' of the pleadings. Quoting Rodick v. City of
Schenectady, l F.3d 1341,1350 (2nd Cir. 1993). * * * [T]he
fact that certain claims did not survive a motion to
dismiss does not warrant the imposition of sanctions in
this case.... See generally Christiansburg Garment Co. v.
EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 422, 98 S.Ct. 694, 54 L.Ed.2d 648
(1978) (warning against the use of 'hindsight logic' that
'because plaintiff did not ultimately prevail, his action
must have been unreasonable or without foundation.').
No Utah Court has held that pursuing an action that is later found to be
barred by res judicata requires the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions. Because
Gillmor's counsel did the research that meets the reasonable and objective standard
of Rule 11(b)(2), the Court of Appeals upheld the District Court's award based on
the incorrect standard of review, and this Court should vacate the sanctions.
CONCLUSION
Rule 11(b)(2) was not violated and sanctions should not have been
awarded. Additionally, Gillmor's action is not barred by res judicata. The Court
should return the case to the District Court for further proceedings on the
substance of Gillmor's Complaint.
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